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Abstract : In successful privately held companies, where main shareholders and managers 
are strongly linked, the exit of a founder creates a dilemma between maximizing their 
wealth through external investment and perpetuating the organizational model by limiting 
external shareholders. Papers generally show that the entrepreneurs’ personal motivations 
are stronger factors, thus explaining the frequent transition of startups to public 
corporation models. But is there leeway to design different governance models, for 
example aiming to facilitate the firm’s transmission? Based on a case study of a french 
management consulting firm, we reveal a variety of parameters that can be at play when 
designing the ownership and management structure of such a company, and thus of the 
possible governance systems to be considered. Although the validity area of the case we 
exhibit is presumably limited, we contend that it opens a category of models that research 
could explore, strengthen and potentially contribute to diffuse. 
Keywords : Corporate governance, Firm succession, Partnerships, Professional Service 
Firms, Privately held companies 
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Introduction 
Succession and exit planning are major concerns for entrepreneurs and especially for 
founders of new entrepreneurial ventures (Ip and Jacobs 2006). As numerous papers point 
out, an understanding of the entrepreneurial process is definitely not complete if this last 
phase is not well described (DeTienne 2010). In particular, research has shown the 
importance of planning founders’ exit ahead because of their strong implication in both the 
management and ownership of their company, causing the exit to have strong impacts on 
the entrepreneur themselves and on the future of the firm (Wasserman 2003). 
In successful and growing privately held companies however, where management and 
shareholding is strongly linked, the exit of the founder – or a major shareholder – creates a 
strong tension between the urge, for the entrepreneur, to benefit from the steady 
appreciation of the shares value, and the perpetuation and continuity of the organizational 
model. Indeed, financing the equity share of the departing founder generally requires 
calling on external investors, be it through buyout, merger, third party sale or public 
offering. As a result, fast growing privately held companies seem to be doomed to endure a 
deep organizational change towards the public corporation model. 
The question of this transition matters because it delineates the governance alternatives for 
companies when they grow from their startup phase to medium-sized and large firms and 
consequently shapes part of their future organizational model and functioning. Yet, most of 
the research conducted on this topic to date has only studied the question from the point of 
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view and rationality of the founder themselves. Authors have shown that the main factors 
influencing the type of exit or succession chosen by the entrepreneur are firms’ size and 
growth rate (Boeker and Karichalil 2002), entrepreneurs’ personal motivations (Graebner 
and Eisenhardt 2004), and previous entrepreneurial experience (Wennberg, Wiklund et al. 
2010, DeTienne and Cardon 2012). In this regard, the success of the exit strategy is 
generally measured by the impact on the wealth and satisfaction of the entrepreneur 
themselves (Hawkey 2002, Stam, Thurik et al. 2010). The research question we propose to 
tackle is thus the following: what is the remaining leeway in terms of governance for the 
exit phase, and can we explore potentially different models to curb the tension between 
wealth maximization and business continuity? 
This paper is based on the case study (Yin 2009) of a french management consulting firm, 
which has developed an uncommon governance model to address this question, and 
appears as an anomaly (Siggelkow 2007) compared with features that are generally 
observed for Professional Service Firms (PSFs). PSFs – firms that "trade[…] on the 
knowledge of [their] human capital (comprising owners and employers) to develop and 
deliver solutions to client problems" (Morris and Anand 2005) – and in particular 
Professional Partnerships (Greenwood, Hinings et al. 1990) are interesting particular cases 
for our subject because their organizational identity is strongly linked to their governance 
model. Contrary to most corporations where shareholders, managers and "operational 
employees" are distinct groups of people, the "partners" of professional partnerships are 
simultaneously the only shareholders (or at least the large majority thereof), managers and 
"key production workers". In such a model, the ownership structure suits the managerial 
and professional model, which relies on the strong "emphasis on collegiality, peer 
evaluation and autonomy" (Greenwood, Hinings et al. 1990) of the employees. In this 
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setting, the financing of founders’ exit through external investment would thus jeopardize 
the very model of the partnership itself, endangering either the former independence of 
managers, or the rewarding system that required to limit the dilution of partners’ equity 
shares. The founders of the firm we study has therefore sought to design a specific model 
aiming at ensuring the transmission of the company to management successors, without 
giving up on capital gain. 
Contrary to the dominant models, this case reveals the variety of parameters that can be at 
play when designing the ownership and management structure of such a company, and thus 
of the possible governance systems to be considered. But it also demonstrates a certain 
level of sophistication and complexity, whose area of validity is presumably limited. We 
contend that this case rightfully opens a category of models that management research 
could explore, strengthen and potentially contribute to diffuse.  
The dilemma of successful firms’ succession: value appreciation vs. organizational 
continuity 
Firm succession is a recurring topic in management research. Extensive research has 
shown the impacts of a change in top executives of firms and the importance of planning 
the transition ahead. Work on succession however covers a wide range of situations in 
which stakes, expected impacts and relevant descriptors are very different. The most 
studied governance structures, essentially the ones of public corporations, suppose a 
"separation of ownership and control" (Fama and Jensen 1983), accentuated by the 
generalization of "dispersed ownership" already theorized by Berle and Means (1932). In 
this setting, what is looked upon when dealing with succession is either the transition 
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between directors or top executives (and in particular CEOs), or the processes of change of 
control (mergers and acquisitions). In both cases, the most recurring line of enquiry is the 
impact of such changes on the shareholders’ wealth, and the best strategies to ensure 
successful planning, ahead of the transition (Friedman and Singh 1989, Davidson, Worrell 
et al. 1990, Shen and Cannella 2003, Huson, Malatesta et al. 2004). 
Many firms though do not satisfy to the separation of ownership and control principle. 
Among them, new entrepreneurial ventures (startups), small businesses or family-owned 
businesses are increasingly studied for the specificity of their governance systems and of 
their challenges. In those firms, firm succession most often equates with what has been 
called "entrepreneurial exit", designating "the process by which the founders of privately 
held firms leave the firm they helped to create; thereby removing themselves, in varying 
degree, from the primary ownership and decision-making structure of the firm" (DeTienne 
2010 p.203). In these cases, the transition implies simultaneously a change in the 
ownership and in the managerial structures, as founders are often both among the main 
shareholders and the top executives. 
Entrepreneurial exit is therefore a "critical component of the entrepreneurial 
process" (DeTienne 2010), which has strong impacts on the entrepreneurs themselves, the 
firms enduring such successions, and the economy on a larger scale (ibid.). It is thus no 
wonder that numerous papers aim at investigating the main factors determining the choice 
of exit type, and leading to their successes or failures (e.g. Wasserman 2003, Stam, Thurik 
et al. 2010, DeTienne and Cardon 2012). However, beyond criteria assessing the success of 
exit regarding the entrepreneurs’ wealth and satisfaction, very few papers study the impacts 
of such successions on the remaining firm, be it its employees, managers or shareholders. 
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Drivers and success of entrepreneurial exits 
Hawkey (2002), in his book Exit Strategy Planning, proposes an extensive list of possible 
types of entrepreneurial exits, ranging from family succession to liquidation, and including 
Management Buy-Out (MBO) or Buy-In (MBI) – i.e. the process by which "the firm can 
be sold to members of the existing management team" or an "external management 
team" (Scholes, Westhead et al. 2008 p.9-10) –, third party sale or merger, and public 
listing (IPO). 
Along with the variety of exit types, Hawkey suggests criteria to help the entrepreneur 
choosing their strategy. These criteria are mainly focused on two dimensions: the wealth 
and personal satisfaction created for the entrepreneur on the one hand, the financial and 
strategic risks on the other hand. As Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004) have shown, these 
two dimensions account for the most part of the drivers leading owners to sell their 
businesses: "strategic hurdles" on the one hand (such as the necessity for top executives 
renewal or funding round), and "personal motivations" on the other. Among the latter, 
financial gain and avoidance of dilution are recurrent motivations for selling. This leads 
both researchers and professionals to publish strategic guides to maximize the financial 
return of exit (e.g. Dreux IV, Etkind et al. 1999, Nemethy 2011), often regardless of the 
continuity of the business. 
Beyond qualitative research examining personal drivers for the choice of exit type, 
quantitative research also deals more generally with predictors of founders’ departure. 
Several dependent variables appear to have a significant relation to the probability of this 
exit: firm size, level of founder ownership and firm growth (Boeker and Karichalil 2002) ; 
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entrepreneurs’ experience, age and education level (Wennberg, Wiklund et al. 2010, 
DeTienne and Cardon 2012) ; achievement of milestones in the strategic development of 
the firm, such as maturity of the product or need for funding round (Wasserman 2003). 
Overall, research on the drivers of entrepreneurial exit thus demonstrates that the future of 
the on-going firm after the exit is on average a minor concern for strategic exit planning. 
Few papers (such as Salvato, Chirico et al. 2010) study the question of business 
"continuity", especially in a family-business setting. And yet, reviewing the main drivers 
for firm succession suggests that such an exit generally creates a strong impact on the firm, 
both a the ownership and at the management level, sometimes strong enough to deeply 
alter the organization identity (ibid.). 
A risk of transforming organizational models 
One of the main features of small entrepreneurial ventures or family-owned businesses that 
are organized as privately-held companies is the strong relationship between shareholding 
and management. Ascertaining the advantages and drawbacks of such a governance model 
is not in the scope of this paper. It is however a core element of the identity of these 
organizations: having top executives as majority shareholders enables for instance a strong 
independence of management from external financial interests and a direct adequacy 
between governance structure and managerial model. As a result, structure of ownership, 
level of profit sharing, and governance rules can be direct management decisions. 
Even in privately-held companies, however, the firm’s growth causes the "market value" of 
the shares to increase. This is for example visible through the value that is negotiated when 
other businesses in the same sector are merged or acquired. If motivated by the drivers 
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mentioned above, such as the financial wealth, planning the exit will include financing the 
equity share of the owner who is leaving. This market value is then a key indicator of the 
funding that will be necessary to find to finance this exit. But in this setting, some of the 
exit types described above would definitely alter the organizational model, thus having a 
strong impact on the on-going firm after exit : 
- Financing the exit by external shareholding: The larger the equity share and the stronger 
the firm’s growth, the more difficult it is to find buyers within the management of the 
firm, and thus to preserve the organizational model. Financing the equity share at the 
market value might require to call for external investors. Then, the larger the equity 
share, the more difficult it becomes to preserve the relationship between ownership and 
control: remaining managers progressively lose their independence vis-à-vis external 
financial interests, as their shares become in minority. 
- Going IPO: A particular case of the previous situation would consist in financing the 
equity share by opening the stock to public listing. In this case, the change of model is 
even deeper as it involves a change in the legal structure of the firm itself, changing 
from privately-held company to public corporation. These first two strategies would also 
enable organizing a new funding round, which would further dilute the shares owned by 
managers. 
- Merging or selling the business: Another way of financing the exit would be to organize 
a merger or acquisition with another firm, thus directly impacting both the ownership 
structure (dilution of remaining shares in the larger capital of the acquiring company) 
and the management structure (fusion between the two hierarchies). 
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- Leveraged Buy-Out: Finally, even if the owner wishes to pass their firm on their family 
or top executives successors (for instance through a Management Buy-Out), the most 
common way to achieve the level of financing required to attain the market value of the 
equity share is to get the firm itself into debt, what is called an LBO (Leveraged Buy-
Out). Although this might at first preserve the organizational model, the higher the 
firm’s growth and the equity share, the higher the strain such a solution would exert on 
the economic soundness of the company. 
As Wasserman (2003) and DeTienne (2010) highlight, these impacts are even accentuated 
if the succession is that of the founder, due for example to the "higher level of attachment 
between Founder-CEOs and the firms they create [and] the much larger equity holdings of 
Founder-CEOs" (Wasserman 2003 p.149). 
As a consequence, it is predictable that the organizational model and identity of such 
privately-held companies is directly put at risk when the firm is successfully developing. 
Both firm’s growth and successful succession planning – from the founder’s point of view 
– raise the probability of a radical organizational change at the time of the first succession. 
Contrary to this "generational" model, is it possible to lay some tracks to a more 
"evergreen" model, which would allow for a better continuity of the organizational identity 
through the firm succession ? 
Methodology : an anomaly in the exacerbated situation of professional partnerships 
Data collection and analysis 
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To tackle this question, we chose to conduct a first exploratory qualitative research, which 
aim was to ascertain the potential of certain governance rules to ensure both the continuity 
of the organizational model and the success of entrepreneurial exits. We conducted a 
qualitative case study (Eisenhardt 1989, Yin 2009) on a french management consulting 
firm, which is about 15 years old, and openly advertises a special care in the transmission 
of its organizational model, and specific ad hoc governance rules. 
We collected data through 4 interviews (roughly two hours each) with one of the co-
founders, today senior vice-president, and a senior partner, today secretary general of the 
firm, both having taken an active part in the building and evolution of the governance and 
ownership structure over the years. These interviews aimed at understanding the rules and 
functioning of the model, including how it was designed, how it has evolved over time, 
and what was its performance over time. This data was triangulated (Flick 2004) thanks to 
archive material, more precisely internal confidential archives of presentations of the 
model to the firms’ consultants and partners since 2010. Following Siggelkow (2007), we 
chose a case that offers new insights and contradictions with standard theoretical models, 
thus "poking holes in existing theories". According to Siggelkow, a single case, when 
carefully chosen and analyzed with precision, can provide a solid basis for the 
establishment of a "free-standing model", that is, a model that seems theoretically 
plausible, and for which the case enables to identify the main relevant parameters. 
Choice of the case 
The choice of a management consulting SME is particularly relevant to our study. As 
Greenwood et al. (1990) have shown, most Professional Service Firms (PSFs) indeed are 
organized following a specific governance model, which they have called the "P2-form", 
for "Professional Partnership". This is a particular case of firms where the separation of 
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ownership and control is deliberately avoided. In this model, the "partners" are 
simultaneously the only shareholders (or at least the large majority thereof), the managers 
and the "key production workers". Legally, two distinct models can be observed 
(Greenwood and Empson 2003) : the first one is a true partnership form, in which partners 
are engaged by name in the collective contract and bear unlimited and joint liability 
regarding the debts of the partnership ; the second one is a privately-held company of close 
corporation, in which shares are not opened for external transfer, but the shareholders 
benefit from limited liability. The firm we study conforms to the second type, although 
recent research (Greenwood, Deephouse et al. 2007) has shown little difference in the 
performance between the two forms. 
Extensive research has focused on the specificities of this model and the reasons why it is 
widespread among PSFs while rarely used elsewhere. In short, it allows to conform the 
ownership structure with the managerial and professional career model, which relies on the 
strong "emphasis on collegiality, peer evaluation and autonomy" (Greenwood, Hinings et 
al. 1990) of the employees. According to Von Nordenflycht (2010), the model is 
explainable by high levels of knowledge intensity, low capital intensity, and a phenomenon 
of "cat herding" which mostly related to the request of autonomy of the consultants. For 
Greenwood and Epson (2003) and Levin and Tadelis (2005), its performance also comes 
from the high incentives it gives to partners-to-be, both financially and in terms of 
governance control, and the drastic selection system it ensures. For instance, the "up-or-
out" scheme demands that professional career milestones correspond to thresholds in 
ownership of equity shares, although access to capital is controlled by cooptation 
mechanisms, thus ensuring that acquiring shares always should be both a motivation and a 
reward for consultants (Levin and Tadelis 2005). Overall, the organizational model is thus 
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part of the very identity of the firm, and is also an asset to recruit high potential 
consultants, who are sensitive to the role they will be brought to play in the governance of 
the company. 
Consequently, a change in the organizational model proves to have strong impact on the 
firm at all levels (remaining shareholders, managers and workers). Research on PSF 
merging has already shown the specific difficulties that such a change in the model could 
cause (Greenwood, Hinings et al. 1994, Empson 2000). And yet, because the size of equity 
ownership is part of the professional advancement system, the model necessarily involves 
a pyramidal structure of ownership in which the founders possess the largest share of the 
capital. Moreover, if the PSF has been successfully growing over the years, the steady 
increase in the value of goodwill causes the market value of the shares to be substantially 
higher at the time of exit than at the firm’s creation. Besides, the constant flux of mergers 
and acquisitions allows for establishing a good estimate of this market value depending on 
the firm’s earnings.  
Professional partnerships’ exits are thus textbook cases of the tension between growth and 
organizational continuity. Due to the limited buying capacity of partners within the 
partnership, defining a "successful exit" as the maximization of wealth of the entrepreneurs 
would urge the founders to sell their shares to external shareholders, who are higher 
bidders. Such a solution would jeopardize the very model of the partnership itself, 
endangering either the former independence of managers, or the rewarding system that 
required to limit the dilution of partners’ equity shares. 
Case study : the uncommon governance model of a french management consulting 
firm 
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History and legal structure of the firm 
Before designing its model, the founders of the firm we study had endured such 
organizational change when they were partners in another consulting firm, whose founder 
and majority shareholder decided to sell to an international company to secure its exit. 
Aware of the risk it would create to replicate the same model into a new firm, they decided 
to design a specific governance system focused on the ability to handover the firm to 
successive generations of partners. 
The firm was created by 5 co-founders with about 50 partners during the first year. 
Although management consulting is a low capital intensity sector, some initial investment 
was necessary to launch the activity, which could not be covered by debt without having 
demonstrated the solvency of the company. This investment was thus provided by the 
initial capital, which was formed thanks to a contribution by all consultants. Yet, it was 
decided to provide a solution for accepting temporary external investment, should the 
revenue become insufficient to cover working capital requirement before the banks could 
accept the first loans. To do so, the firm was separated in two legal entities: the consulting 
activity would take place in a Société Anonyme (SA, roughly equivalent to a public 
corporation) and would be the employer ; and the entirety of its capital would be owned by 
a Société par Actions Simplifiées (SAS) taking the form of a privately-held company, and 
called the partnership because its capital was directly provided by the partners. With this 
structure, it would be possible to temporarily create shares at the first level (SA) to 
welcome external shareholders, without jeopardizing the independence of the partnership, 
which would always keep the majority of the SA ownership. 
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To create the incentives pertaining to the "up-or-out" scheme, and preserve the governance 
power of the co-founders, two categories of partners were statutorily created. A threshold 
in the quantity of shares hold by a partner was defined to separate partners from "senior 
partners". The latter were to hold at all times at least 60% of the voting power within the 
partnership, the remaining being held by the rest of the partners. As a result, senior partners 
have an important role in the governance bodies of the firm, be it the partnership council 
(elected by all partners), the committee of the senior partners, or the committee for 
remuneration and promotion, which is responsible for co-opting consultants to partners and 
senior partners classes through the distribution of shares. When a consultant or partner is 
elected to be offered new shares, these shares are created through a capital increase, and 
sold to the partner or partner-to-be. 
So far, the organizational model is quite common among consulting firms. If the criteria 
for successful exits were used in this case, that is, maximization of the founders wealth and 
minimization of risks, one would expect a quite simple functioning thereafter. The 
financial structure of such a firm is well-known. The activity and its sources of profits and 
losses are quite predictable, therefore a single indicator is generally used to measure the 
level of profitability: the level of fees paid per consultant. As a consequence, the market 
value of the firm is itself quite predictable, and mostly depends on the average revenue, 
which is in turn directly linked to this single indicator. In order to maximize personal 
wealth, a partner can thus play on two variables: decrease the shares dilution, i.e. strongly 
restrict the number of consultants who can buy shares, and increase the number of non-
partner consultants, i.e. the level of revenues. In other words, enlarge the size of the cake 
and lower the number of slices. 
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Yet, the founders’ wish was to prevent the scenario of the previous consulting firm from 
happening again. They had defined a kind of specification sheet for a model that we call 
"evergreen" because of its emphasis on continuity, which is summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1 - Main targeted objectives of the model to be designed by the co-founders  
A governance and ownership model dedicated to transmission 
To ensure the transmission of the business, the founders decided to implement different 
governance rules so as to avoid this scenario, which have been written in the articles of the 
partnership. 
a. Planned and regulated exit 
First, it was deemed very important that capital ownership be linked to the professional 
activity within the firm, and to the level of potential an employee could still provide to the 
collective. As such, it was required that no partner could continue to hold shares while 
having retired – more specifically while approaching the end of the career – thus 
preventing partners to keep on concentrating capital. To provide an equal rule for all 
shareholders, it was decided that all partners reaching the age of 57 would be force to sell 
their shares to the partnership, so that they would be redistributed amongst younger 
partners and consultants. 
b. Dual valuation of the shares 
Business continuity Ease the handover of the firm to future generations of managers
Management training Progressively associate partners as future managers
Risk mitigation Curb the financial and legal risks created by the model
Attractiveness to partners Growth of the shares’ value and system of incentives
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Second, in order to ensure transmission, one has to ensure that younger consultants keep an 
easy access to the capital. In most cases, the increase of the stock market value 
progressively postpones the moment when a consultant is able to buy a share, buy rising 
the entry cost. In our case, the founders chose to deliberately lower the internal price of 
new shares, so that newcomers could get very early into the capital, at one of the lowest 
level of seniority compared with competitors. 
However, valuing the shares at such a low level for exiting partners would obviously 
deprive the seniors from part of the financial value they have contributed to create, 
especially when they are forced to leave at a given time. To prevent this from happening, it 
was proposed that the entry and exit prices of the shares would be different. In other 
words, each share has two simultaneous values, calculated by formulas that are regularly 
collectively voted by the partners: a low entry price guaranteeing that newcomers have 
access to the capital, and a high exit price, taking into account the growth of the firm since 
its creation. This way, when a partner leaves by selling X shares to the partnership at a high 
price, the partnership is able to redistribute these X shares to existing or new partners at an 
affordable price. 
c. Financial risk management through the constitution of reserves and profit steering 
Obviously, the partnership has to bear the cost caused by the difference in both valuations. 
Two financial provisions have been taken to curb the risks of such design. First, the highest 
price, only available to partners who leave the partnership at 57 – or for medical reasons – 
is not equivalent to the market value that could be expected if the partnership was to be 
sold, but approximately two times lower. Second, since this cost is almost entirely 
predictable, because it is directly linked to the age pyramid of the partnership, it is possible 
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to constitute accounting reserves in advance, by deducting some of the profit to ensure that 
cash flow will be sufficient to reclaim the shares. 
Two more measures complete the model to protect it over time and provide some 
adjustment variables. On the one hand, as the time of exit is imposed to the partners, it is 
not possible for them to adjust their exit to a potential variability of the value of the shares. 
To prevent a volatility of the price that would put some partners at a disadvantage, the 
price is smoothed over several years by the computation formula. On the other hand, a 
long enough or strong enough period of decline (such as the decrease in activity due to the 
global crisis) would jeopardize the model because it would become impossible to fund the 
entry of younger partners. Hence, it was decided from the firm’s creation that the fixed 
component of the consultants’ remuneration be rather low (lower than the average on the 
sector), so that the variable component could play the role of adjustment variable in the 
case of economic difficulties. 
In effect, the model builds therefore a strong solidarity between all classes of consultants, 
so that younger ones may easily have access to the capital, and that senior ones would keep 
their trust in the value of their investment in the firm. This model enabled to go through the 
recent crisis while ensuring a sustainable and steady growth of the value of the business, 
keeping all employees and not lowering the fees per consultant despite the tightening of 
the market. 
d. Steering of the creation and distribution of equity 
Finally, beyond financial provisions to ensure the manageability of the model, the role of 
the governance committees dedicated to the evolution of the ownership structure is pivotal. 
It is indeed these committees that adjust in real time the slicing of the cake according to its 
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present and foreseeable future size. These governance bodies have two main roles: 
ensuring that each share does not lose value over time (otherwise the partners would not 
want to invest in the partnership anymore) and distributing shares to consultants so that 
their professional career fits with their commitment in the partnerships’ ownership and 
governance. 
To do so, they monitor two main parameters of the ownership structure: the level of fees 
per share, and the number of consultants in each class (shareholder non-partner, partner, 
senior partner). Both are indeed major indicators of the partnership’s stability. On the one 
hand, the level of total fees per share is a good approximation for the evolution trend of the 
value of each share, because it is the main component in the calculation of its market 
value. The objective is thus to steer the quantity of created shares each year so that this 
indicator is at the very least stable, and preferably slowly growing. On the other hand, 
partners have to decide on the distribution of the created shares. Here, the objective of 
transmission is coupled with the professional career path of each consultant: so as to avoid 
the concentration of capital, the amount of shares sold to senior partners is carefully 
monitored, and the shares are thus distributed among the categories of partners in order to 
promote high potential employees, and to fuel the pipe of future senior partners, thus 
avoiding a too pyramidal structure of ownership. The thresholds between the different 
categories may be revised over the years so that senior partners always keep about 60% of 
the voting power in the partnership. 
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Figure 1 - Schematized representation of the governance and ownership structure of the studied case 
Discussion and Conclusion 
A new balance between wealth maximization and co-operative objectives 
We can already derive two main results from this case study. First, it epitomizes the tension 
that arises in steadily growing firms between the personal financial interests of the 
founders – or main shareholders – and the objective of perpetuating the organizational 
model and pass the firm on to management successors. The model described in our paper 
reveals numerous compromises designed to simultaneously preserve the trust of partners as 
financial investors, and the trust of consultants as future seniors. 
Second, it shows that even when wealth maximization is not the main purpose of the 
founder, the adequate governance and ownership structure does not appear to be self-
evident. On the contrary, no "off-the-shelf" model seems to fit the specification sheet for a 
transmission-oriented firm. As a result, the rules defined by the firm’s founders prove to be 
quite complex, depending on more than 20 parameters and 10 equations to fully steer the 
ownership structure, financial stability, and professional career paths according to the 
collective purposes ; relying on several legal entities with a multiplicity of governance 
bodies ; and most importantly demanding the invention of uncommon statutory rules for 
shareholders, which are not without causing some legal issues.  
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We propose to interpret this complexity as the result of a design process initially aiming at 
finding balance between the traditional wealth capitalization model on the one side, and 
the co-operative, sharing-oriented doctrine on the other side. As literature have shown, the 
equation between management and ownership is at the core of the professional partnership 
model: this model ensures a strong autonomy of the partners, both individually and in 
general as the firm is exempt of the pressure of external investors (Greenwood, Hinings et 
al. 1990). In fact, the distribution of equity appears as a management device, on which 
several features of the PSF model are based, such as the incentive to participate in the 
governance of the firm. 
Still, the managerial discretion resulting from this situation is put at risk when few 
individuals – founders, for instance – concentrate the capital and are able to run the firm 
for their own interests. One customary way of preventing this concentration from 
happening, while conserving a close corporation model where external investors are 
prohibited, is on the contrary to follow the co-operative model, where each worker gets a 
share in the capital. At first sight, this model seems particularly suited to PSFs because 
they benefit from a relative homogeneity of the workforce (Von Nordenflycht 2010). 
Moreover, this model seems to fit the purpose of transmission, since no worker or manager 
is privileged in the distribution of shares. Several features of the functioning of PSFs 
however conflict with this solution:  
- Partners do not benefit from the growth of the partnership whereas capital investment 
in rival firms appears as a good long term investment ; 
- The incentives systems such as "up-or-out" are discredited by the flat ownership 
structure ; 
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- The distribution of equity is cannot be a management device anymore. 
Table 2 - Comparison between three gouvernance and ownership models in accordance with their 
objectives 
Table 2 shows how the firm we have described thus proposes a new model to manage the 
tension between the two previous types of "drift" about the capacity to manage capital 
within the firm, and therefore to support the ability to pass the firm on to future 
generations. 
Employee ownership as a management variable to preserve organizational identity 
The literature on entrepreneurial exit we have developed above reveals a variety of drivers 
for organizational change of new entrepreneurial venture and small, or family-owned 
businesses. Especially, the search for external funding, and for the wealth maximization of 
exiting founders, are strong drivers that explain the transformation from privately-held 
companies to public corporations, or at least to external ownership. This transformation 
generally involves a deep change in the relationship between management and ownership, 
and goes with the loss of some management variables, or independence vis-à-vis financial 
interests. 
Founder wealth 
maximization model
Transmission 
oriented model
Co-operative-like 
model
Capital increase Restricted shares 
creation (low dilution)
Shares creation steered 
by economic results
One worker = one 
share
Shares buying price Market value Entry price steered to 
ease access to capital
Face value
Shares exit price Market value Collectively calculated 
exit price
Face value (no capital 
gain)
Exit planning Autonomous Regulated to prevent 
capital concentration
Linked to employment
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Still, numerous papers show that the last decades have known an inversion of the trend in 
this transformation: firms are increasingly "going private", meaning that they quit a public 
corporation model for a privately-held model (Block 2004, Mehran and Peristiani 2010). 
Literature about leveraged and management buyouts has boomed over the last two 
decades. Although a convincing explanation of the "going private" movement is the US is 
the enforcement of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Engel, Hayes et al. 2007), some papers have 
shown that the managerial model (and in particular the managerial autonomy) is an 
important variable to explain the phenomenon (Weir, Laing et al. 2005, Boot, Gopalan et 
al. 2008). In these cases, firms often go back on their decisions to go IPO because the 
lower cost of the capital is not compensating the negative impacts of the change in 
organizational model (ibid.). Yet, buyouts have been shown to have strong impacts on the 
organizations (Palepu 1990), especially towards the increase of shareholder value 
(Easterwood, Seth et al. 1989) at the expense of employees’ wages (Amess and Wright 
2007). This research might open a new way to smooth the organizational changes due to 
life cycles in the transfer of ownership. 
Our case study shows that employee ownership can be open new management variables to 
control the evolution and transmission of the firm, and solve usual contradictions between 
the stakeholders’ interests. Indeed, the creation and distribution of shares to employees and 
the use of differentiated share prices between entry and exit can be used as a way to 
stabilize both the ownership and the management structure, opening the path to a kind of 
"evergreen" model of the private corporation where equity transfer enables also the 
continuity of organizational identity. 
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This result could promote a specific understanding of employee ownership models such as 
those promoted by the "shared capitalism" proposal (Kruse, Freeman et al. 2010, Carberry, 
Labor et al. 2011), in which a variety of situations ranging from the mere profit sharing 
(variable bonuses, no participation in the governance) to co-operatives are considered. For 
the moment, our research focuses on a single case, further research is therefore needed to 
ascertain the general validity of such models, in particular in other sectors than 
Professional Service Firms.  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